Everything you instinctively knew was wrong about sex ed, but couldn't articulate

https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2018/12/46417/

Put in your folded-chasuble orders now!

Ad experimentum indult issued to the FSSP for widespread use of the 1955 Holy Week rites.

First seen (watch out, that's a google translation from Polish) here.

Thoughts on a Parade Underneath One's Window

And all the earth was in admiration after the beast. And they adored the dragon, which gave power to the beast: and they adored the beast, saying: Who is like to the beast? and who shall be able to fight with him? ... And it was given unto him to make war with the saints, and to overcome them. And power was given him over every tribe, and people, and tongue, and nation. And all that dwell upon the earth adored him, whose names are not written in the book of life of the Lamb.

Unhelpful Answers

Since laws interest me, both personally and professionally, I try to acquire and maintain a smattering of familiarity with Canon Law. In pursuit to that goal, I follow Cathy Caridi's Canon Law Made Easy. It is, generally, an excellent source for interesting and insightful commentary on canonical questions.

But I believe she has made a remarkably unhelpful post on the topic of baptismal validity: "Why Is This Method of Baptism Illicit?"

In short, the interlocutor whose question is addressed in the post asked whether her Protestant baptism was invalid because the water did not flow across her: the Protestant minister "patted [her] on the top of the head" with "moistened" fingers.

Now, it's commonly accepted---or at least widely reported, see, e.g., William Fanning, Baptism, in The Catholic Encyclopedia (1907), available at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/02258b.htm---that water must "flow" over the person's body in order for baptism to be effected.

But instead of addressing what it means for water to "flow," Ms. Caridi provides an (undeniably fascinating and of-itself-insightful) commentary on the liceity and history of baptism by aspersion. But that isn't really what the interlocutor wanted to know, or what she asked. What her question drove at is the different question of "how much flow is flow?" I would very much have liked to read Ms. Caridi's comments on the definition of "flowing water." Unfortunately, I didn't get to do so.

More on Christmastide Calendars

One can find the Universal Norms on the Liturgical Year and the General Roman Calendar here. One can find the 1917 Code of Canon Law here.

Interestingly, the Universal Norms incorporate the transfer of certain feasts, including the Epiphany, to the following Sunday when not observed as distinct holydays of obligation. Thus, it would appear that one need not argue how much of a feast gets transferred or suppressed when the episcopal conference suppresses (or transfers) the obligation to hear Mass: the move to Sunday is part of the definition of the feast.

So this coming Friday really isn't, for Code of Canon Law purposes, the feast of the Epiphany in any sense, outside, perhaps, of a personal parish or (more certainly) a place where it remains a holyday of obligation. This is a followup of sorts to an older post, here.

Doe v. Milward & Fourth Amendment Intent

There is a post over at the Volokh Conspiracy on a new 11th Circuit ruling raising an interesting fourth-amendment question in a rather delicate factual context. The dispute is, in essence, whether, for purposes of the fourth amendment, the government has to be looking for something before a given undertaking constitutes a search.

Judge Pryor, writing for the 11th Circuit, says "no." The case involves a fourth-amendment claim by state-school sonography students who claim they were coerced into undergoing transvaginal ultrasounds. Judge Pryor writes:

Inserting a probe into a woman’s vagina is plainly a search when performed by the government. Where the government physically intrudes on a subject enumerated within the Fourth Amendment, such as a person, a search “has undoubtedly occurred.” United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950–51 & n.3 (2012). The Supreme Court has long recognized that compelled blood and urine tests implicate the Fourth Amendment. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (citing Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767–68 (1966)). Even under the broader test that a “search” is “any governmental act that violates a reasonable expectation of privacy,” O’Rourke v. Hayes, 378 F.3d 1201, 1207 (11th Cir. 2004), each ultrasound clearly constituted a search. “[I]t is obvious” that the “compelled intrusio[n] into the body . . . infringes an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Doe v. Milward, --- F.3d ---, No. 15-15240, slip op. at  10 (11th Cir., Oct. 4, 2016).

Professor Ker does not expressly disagree, but he is not convinced:

... I think there is a sort of Fourth Amendment intent requirement under Footnote 5 of United States v. Jones. Here’s the key language from Jones with my emphasis added:

The concurrence notes that post-Katz we have explained that “‘an actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.’ ” Post, at 6 (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U. S. 705, 713 (1984)). That is undoubtedly true, and undoubtedly irrelevant. Karo was considering whether a seizure occurred, and as the concurrence explains, a seizure of property occurs, not when there is a trespass, but “when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” Post, at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise with a search. 

Trespass alone does not qualify [to be a search], but there must be conjoined with that what was present here: an attempt to find something or to obtain information.

Related to this, and similarly irrelevant, is the concurrence’s point that, if analyzed separately, neither the installation of the device nor its use would constitute a Fourth Amendment search. See ibid. Of course not. A trespass on “houses” or “effects,” or a Katz invasion of privacy, is not alone a search unless it is done to obtain information; and the obtaining of information is not alone a search unless it is achieved by such a trespass or invasion of privacy.

Is it possible to square Jones with Soldal['s statement that the reason an officer might enter a house is irrelevant]? I think so, because a government agent can have a purpose to obtain information without a broader investigative or administrative purpose. The question of investigative or administrative purpose is arguably more an issue of motive than intent. It asks, “Why did the officer want to obtain the information?” That is distinct from whether the officer intended to obtain information at all.

Respectfully, Professor Kerr has missed the distinction, although he may have done so because there is a missing term in Judge Pryor's opinion. "Inserting a probe into a woman's vagina," without more, is not plainly a search. It is plainly a trespass. In order for the act to be a search, the probe, or the circumstances of its use, must be such as naturally tend to reveal something that is otherwise unknown. On balance, the more useful opinion is probably Florida v. Jardines, rather than Jones. There, the Court held that information-gathering conducted during a trespass was an unreasonable search, while noting its opinions "holding that the subjective intent of the officer is irrelevant." Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, __ (2013).

An ultrasound, by its nature, is inquisitive: it reveals something otherwise concealed from view. The fourth amendment does not protect persons from unreasonable intrusion, but from unreasonable searches. The mere fact that the government might not care what it finds in the search in no way alters the inherent character of the act. Officers who enter a dwelling and empty all the drawers simply to harass the homeowner have "searched" the premises, even if they never had any intention of locating or carrying away evidence.

The same principle applies under the Milward facts: a state agent who performs a transvaginal ultrasound conducts a search of the subject's abdominal cavity, even if the agent remains indifferent to its contents. The result would be different if the subject were merely imposed upon with a disconnected probe: that activity would not be revelatory either in nature or effect. It would simply be a trespass. Judge Pryor would have strengthened his opinion if he had captured the distinction in the excerpted language.

The General Roman Calendar of 1970

Because sometimes you need to check on a solemnity: http://www.binetti.ru/collectio/liturgia/missale_files/crg.htm.

In re Iconography

We, therefore, following the royal pathway and the divinely inspired authority of our Holy Fathers and the traditions of the Catholic Church (for, as we all know, the Holy Spirit dwells in her), define with all certitude and accuracy that, like the figure of the precious and life-giving Cross, so also, venerable and holy images of our Lord God and Savior Jesus Christ, of our spotless Lady, the Mother of God, of the honorable angels, of all saints and of all the just, whether painted or made of mosaic or another suitable material, are to be set forth in the holy churches of God, on the sacred vessels, on the vestments, on walls and panels, in houses, and on streets.  For the more frequently they are seen in artistic representation, the more readily men are lifted up to the memory of their prototypes and to longing after them; and to these should be given due greeting and honorable reverence, not indeed that adoration (latreia) which pertains to the divine nature alone, but incense and candles may be offered to these, as to the figure of the precious and life-giving Cross, the Book of the Gospels, and other holy objects, according to ancient and pious custom.  For the honor that is paid to the image passes on to what the image represents, and he who reveres the image reveres in it the subject represented.
(2d Council of Nicea, A.D. 787)

The images of Christ, of the Virgin Mother of God, and of other saints are to be kept and preserved, in places of worship especially, and to them due honor and veneration is to be given, not because it is believed that there is in them anything divine or any power for which they are revered, nor in the sense that something is sought from them or that a blind trust is put in images as once was done by the gentiles who placed their hope in idols, but because the honor that is shown to them is referred to the original subjects that they represent. Thus, through these images that we kiss and before which we kneel and uncover our heads, we are adoring Christ and venerating the saints whose likeness these images bear.
(Council of Trent, Session XXV, December 1563)

The same subject, continued.

Reform of the Reform?

Rorate Caeli writes:

Intentionally celebrating the Mass facing the people, displacing the altar from the sanctuary (and in fact doing away with a tangible "sanctuary" in the traditional sense), covering up or removing the high altar, the use of a "table-altar", communion no longer received while kneeling ... we are often assured by "conservative" writers that these had nothing to do either with Paul VI or Vatican II, and in fact became widespread only years later, and against the express will of both. However, the records of this Mass and of Masses publicly celebrated by Paul VI in the years immediately after 1965 show that he was at the vanguard of these changes. This is ironic given the tendency in some Reform of the Reform circles to point to the "1965 Missal" as the way to resacralization and the return to tradition for the wider Church -- a Missal whose very birth was attended by many of the innovations now deplored by these same circles.

Equally of note is that these innovations, which many in the Reform of the Reform camp assert have nothing to do with Vatican II because these are not mentioned in the actual text of Sacrosanctum Concilium, were already taking place in Rome itself, with the Pope's own endorsement and in his presence, long before the Council ended on December 8, 1965. 

(emphasis in original). I think Rorate is both wrong and right here. Obviously the record is as they describe it: Paul VI, Bugnini, and the lot were engaged in shenanigans that presaged (or reinforced) what happened around the world. But the argument that so-called conservatives make is narrower. That is, essentially, a textualist argument against the dynamic interpretative hermeneutic of the 1960s: Sacrosanctum Concilium does not say X, Y, or Z, and so one cannot be compelled to regard the presence of X, Y, or Z in the Mass as necessary or needful, nor can one legitimately be portrayed as opposing the Second Vatican Council's request for liturgical reforms* by saying otherwise.

"[W]hen  upon a point of ritual or of dedication or special worship a man talks to you of the Spirit and Intention, and complains of the dryness of the Word, look at him askance. He is not far removed from Heresy."

Everyone knows what actually happened, and everyone knows that Paul VI was, more or less, culpable for it. The debate over whether or not the texts can support the authentic reform that did not happen (a debate I do not enter here on the merits) is simply another matter.

------------------------------

* Set aside for the moment whether one may take such a position (it is abundantly evident that one may): opposing things that happen in practice is different, if not per se better, than opposing the actual request for reform articulated by the Council.

They have weekends in Canada, no?

I don't know how scared I'd be of a cease-and-desist letter written by an attorney who used the phrase "end of business on February 22, 2015."

Well that was not bright

The Apostolic Commissioner, who has never exactly smelled of roses, claims that recent reporting on the status of a lawsuit between himself and the Manelli family contained material misstatements. When one reports on a defamation case, it might behoove one to get the facts straight.

Now, I don't read Italian, so while I can click through the links from Rorate's original post on the topic back to the source at "Don Camillo's" blog, I cannot verify whether the translation of Fr. Volpi's most recent letter on the topic is an accurate summary of the original article. Notably, it does not track what Rorate itself originally posted: the new letter by Fr. Volpi quotes the original writer as claiming he "was sentenced." I do not see this phrase in Rorate's original piece (at least, it's not there now: I'm not digging through caches and the wayback machine to see what was originally there; apparently the original source has admitted that "sentenced" was a mistake, assuming Google Translate gives an accurate sense).

A few thoughts:

1. In the United States, the truth is an absolute defense to a defamation action.¹
2. Also in the United States, a public figure can prevail in a defamation action only by showing "'actual malice'---that is, [that the statement was made] with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."²
3. European law is less protective of speech in general; the truth has not traditionally been an absolute defense and apparently remains not-a-defense in Italy.³
4. Thus, one can see why, perhaps, Fr. Volpi might have negotiated a settlement while still maintaining that his statement regarding the Manelli family "was no lie, and could easily be verified."⁴ In Italy, the truth of the statement is not a guaranty of victory at trial.
5. At the same time, it would be very unusual for one to enter into a settlement agreement that contained an actual admission of wrongdoing. Most settlement agreements expressly disclaim any such admission.
6. That the settlement was confirmed by a court order is not implausible, though: even in the U.S. a settlement may be incorporated into a final consent judgment. Since the settlement in the Volpi case was purportedly negotiated in court-ordered mediation, it would not be outside the realm of reasonableness for that to have occurred.
7. The defamation knife cuts both ways, of course: regarding Fr. Volpi's claim to be preparing a lawsuit of his own and rescission of the settlement agreement, one can say (a) that Rorate, to the extent its writers are situated in the U.S., is probably immune from any liability for its February 16, 2015, post, as Fr. Volpi is almost certainly a public or limited-public figure and Rorate's publication is unlikely to qualify as actually malicious; (b) that Don Camillo's potential liability would be governed by Italian law, which may be less forgiving; and (c) that while mileage may vary in Italy, Fr. Volpi would be unlikely to have grounds to rescind the settlement agreement under American legal principles unless the Don Camillo figure were under the Manelli family's control or he wrote what he did as a result of some conduct by them prohibited under the agreement.

P.S. (Feb. 23, 2015): It might go without saying, but in case it does not, my thoughts here are not on the merits of the Manelli suit against Fr. Volpi, nor of Fr. Volpi's claims against the Manelli family or anyone else. Opining on the merits would require knowledge of the true facts, which I lack. As for the matter in general, Fr. Volpi is the principal agent in what is, from all appearances, the profoundly unjust oppression of the F.F.I., a role for which he deserves opprobrium. That is true regardless of what legal claims he or anyone else might have.

---

1  See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964).^↩
2  Id. at 279--80.^↩
3  International Press Institute, Key Findings: Defences in Defamation Cases, http://www.freemedia.at/ecpm/key-findings/defences-in-defamation-cases.html (last accessed February 19, 2015).^↩
4  Was the statement true? Who knows; I have no way of knowing and it is beyond my purposes here to consider the question.^↩

Millstones

One would prefer to have quotes, rather than paraphrases. But the paraphrases are bad enough. Surely God has given us the leaders we deserve, rather than those we need.

Poscia ch'io v'ebbi alcun riconosciuto,
vidi e conobbi l'ombra di colui
che fece per viltade il gran rifiuto.

The Supposed Scandal of Proper Attire

Whiskey Catholic doesn't have a comments box, so I will make some comments on a recent post in this space.

First, the minutiae: the query posted by Whiskey Catholic contributor Michael asks about a "white tie" function and the lay perception of proper clerical attire thereat. Michael responds with a statement about "a black tie dinner." These, of course, are not the same thing. White tie is formal, black tie is semi-formal. Most American men will never again have the opportunity to attend a true white-tie function. It is our loss. In either event,* however, the proper clerical attire is not merely a cassock (as Michael says), but a cassock and ferraiolo. If a secular priest appeared at a formal function without a ferraiolo, he would be---and I would certainly think him---sloppily under-dressed. As for cuffs, one does not wear barrel cuffs with formal-wear. Laymen certainly do not, and it has been my impression (although I have not consulted an etiquette guide on the topic) that clerics do not either. So yes, a secular cleric at a formal or semi-formal affair should wear linked cuffs.

Second, the more substantial point: Michael's general take on the inquiry is spot-on. It bears noting that all of the situations inquired about by the reader involve the hypothetical priest being "on duty" or "at work," so to speak. The issue is not what does a priest wear about the rectory when reasonably secure from inquiring eyes, it was what does the priest wear when out and about, performing his sacred functions or at least appearing in public qua priest. And the laity not only expect, they desperately need, priests to conduct themselves in those moments in a manner concomitant with the dignity of their priesthood. (Frankly, we all need to conduct ourselves in a manner more concomitant with even basic human dignity, particularly in terms of dress.)

If I may diverge on one point, I can think of plenty of times it would be appropriate for a priest to wear sneakers, but they all involve athletics, or perhaps gardening. Priests, after all, can garden, play sports, and go running without giving scandal.

The risk of scandal is not from the priest who is properly attired, but rather from one who slouches about his parish in orange sneakers.


* If there is a distinction between clerical formal and semi-formal attire, I have never heard about it. But I haven't done a study. In a sane world, one would learn these things in a seminary, instead of debating whether one is expected to wear tennis shoes.

Hear Ye

Seven or eight months ago, it looked as if the next big thing, in the intellectual life of the Church, was going to be a showdown over the intellectual and theological compatibility between the American experiment and Catholic orthodoxy: Patrick Deneen called the disciples of John Courtney Murray out on the mat, John Zmirak was pulling out the long knives for traditionalists on social-policy grounds, I got banned from The Catholic Thing combox (apparently for my comments here), and it looked as if there was going to be a rumble. The Francis pontificate, with nothing good to say about existing economic systems, seemed a good time for it.

But then Cardinal Kasper crawled out of his hole. This topic does not need restating at length: suffice to say that there are persons within the Church, aided by secular agitators, who have mounted an attack on the truth of Christ's express teachings on the nature and indissolubility of marriage (as reaffirmed by, inter alia, the Council of Trent, Pius XII, and St. John Paul II). Their error incorporates ancillary assaults upon St. Paul's clear statement on the conditions for reception of the Blessed Sacrament and the Church's unchanging teaching about the nature of repentance. The confusion Kasperianism has already wrought has been substantial. The fact that it has been the topic of official discussion within the Leonine Walls has led, in places, to concern among the faithful over the nature of the Church's indefectibility. It is a pernicious heresy masquerading as an antinomianist canonical reform movement. The chicanery of the 2014 Special Synod was not its end: Kasperianism has plenty of dry powder.

The time has come, then, for all those who will withstand this error to do so. In order to do that in good array, orthodox Catholics need to lay aside their own disputes. This is no longer the time to revisit the merits of John Courtney Murray. It is no longer the time to play "I-told-you-so" over liturgical matters, or to throw bombs at people because of the perceived box in which they sit. Now is the time to pull together against a common foe.

Joseph Shaw had a series of articles on the nature of divisions amongst orthodox Catholics at his LMS Chairman Blog (here, here, and here). His thesis is that the heterodox are able to present a united front because their aim is destruction: who cares how the edifice is pulled down? The conservative, on the other hand, are divided, because before one may preserve a thing, he must decide what it is he wants to preserve, and there is disagreement about that.

Anyway, Modestinus picked up this idea over at Opus Publicum, and raised the prospect of a unilateral Traditionalist disarmament in pursuit of the fight against Kasperianism. He then announced such a move on his own part.

This page does not attract readers; I keep it for my own edification. But let me say, for the record, that Modestinus's proposal should be adopted across the board. That means you, Rorate Caeli: stop sneering at "neo-Caths" and "conservative Catholics" when something bad happens. Just report the news and write about goings on (a necessary service your blog does very well), but save the barbs for the common enemy. It also means you, writers and editors of The Remnant. The various interlocutors who have crossed swords with the traditional movement may not be correct; their errors may be dangerous in certain ways. But they are not as dangerous as the Kasperianists. Points of disagreement with them can almost certainly be discussed, when necessary, without resorting to epithets. But the internecine fighting amongst the orthodox needs to stop, and this has to be a first step.

Of course, one would hope for reciprocation. One could hope that Fr. Longnecker, Elizabeth Scalia, Matthew Schmitz (was I supposed to have heard of this man before he started making snyde comments about Rorate Caeli?), and even (mirabile dictu) Mark Shea and John Zmirak might stop hyperventilating over the perceived excesses or peccadilloes of those attached to the Old Rites and (or) a less Americanized view of Catholic Social Teaching. 

The time has come, at least for the time, to take a phrase from the parents' handbook: "Just Drop It, Y'all."

So let's. Just drop it. Stop it with the internecine squabbling, backbiting, and name-calling.

Postscript: "But, but, what about Vatican II?" you ask. What about it? The Council issued no anathemas, it defined nothing. You are free, so far as the Council itself appears to be concerned, to believe anything you like about it. It took place, it was an ecumenical council, and it did not definitively teach error: that's what we know. Beyond that, who cares? Even if we care for other purposes, the Council---or at the very least its contentious passages---have nothing to do with the present problem. So fights over the interpretation of the Council (which, given that the Council did not itself demand that we believe anything in particular, I find a futile endeavor) are irrelevant for the present. Lay them aside.

Estop

One sees "estopped to" and "estopped from." Which is right?

Well, both get you the maximum 10,000 hits that Westlaw can process on all-states/all-feds. The oldest result for "from" is McDonald v. King, 1 N.J.L. 432 (N.J. 1791). For "to," you have Holmes v. Kennedy, 1 Root 77 (Conn. 1775).

Bad Tennessee Decisions: State v. Marcum

The idea has been advanced recently that it is an attack on the independence of the judiciary to suggest that members of the appellate courts should be dismissed via retention election. I submit that most Tennessee appellate judges should be so dismissed, on the basis that our appellate courts routinely demonstrate legal reasoning so poor as to shock the conscience.

Here is an example: State v. Marcum, 109 S.W.3d 300 (Tenn. 2003). This is a criminal appeal involving the proper interpretation of a statute that is not exactly fit for mixed company, Tennessee Code Annotated § 39–13–501(7). That statute provides:

(7) “[Defined Term]” means [A], [B], [C], [D], or any other intrusion, however slight . . . .

In the statute, the terms that have replaced by letters are assorted acts. The Supreme Court holds, in Marcum, that act [C] can be committed without an "intrusion": "The phrase, 'or any other intrusion,' has no modifying effect upon the defined . . . acts. The word 'or,' as used in the statute, is a coordinating conjunction that functions merely to introduce a generic non-specific alternative."

This is nonsense. The word "or" is certainly disjunctive, but the court has read the word "other" out of the statute. The word "other" is certainly descriptive of the preceding list. Conversation would become impossible otherwise:

Q: Do you have any pets?
A: A dog, a cat, and a fish.
Q: Do you have any other animals?
A: A dog, a cat, and a fish.

Rinse, lather, repeat. The word "other" means that A, B, C, and D are all acts that involve "intrusion," but if the legislature left any off, they count too. Ejusdem generis and Noscitur a sociis both suggest this result: you do not read words in a statute in isolation. (Those principles also reinforce the conclusion that "intrusion" should be an element of each act, given the Defined Term, which, let us say, suggests such an element.) And each word in the statute should have a meaning. Deleting the word "other" yields precisely the result that the court reached: reaching the definition of each item without reference to the "intrusion" element. What we have here instead is sloppy, results-driven adjudication. If the court wants to adopt a "the sonofabitch had it coming" rule for criminal cases, let them do that and then take the consequences. 

Gee Willikers

Rorate Caeli has a transcript up of a pair of talks by a very earnest, very well-intentioned priest on the works of Tolkien and Lewis.

Several brief comments.

First, the good father seems to be responding primarily to Joseph Pearce's somewhat hyperbolic treatment of Tolkien more than to Tolkien himself. I don't know (although it is, I suppose, possible) that Tolkien himself discussed his work in the exuberantly theological terms that Pearce has employed.

Second, insofar as Father wants to criticize Pearce's gloss, the criticism may be warranted. (I haven't read Pearce's works on Tolkien, simply seen bits, snatches, and summaries.) Middle Earth is manifestly not the actual universe and Iluvatar is manifestly not the one true God. Implying otherwise quickly, and for the reasons Father notes, places the basic underpinnings of the story at odds with the Truth.

Third, however, the fact that Middle Earth and its universe are not our actual universe seems to deflate much of Father's criticism. It is one thing, and quite an understandable thing, to criticize a work for presenting a false idea about the world. It is something else entirely to criticize it for presenting an idea at all about some other world. The Church has always condemned witchcraft and the occult because these things either present false explanations for the reality of our world or represent efforts to wield diabolical powers. But if we posit, simply as an exercise of the imagination, a world other than our own, in which the laws of nature and the the universe are not the same, and if the workings of that world involve what we would term "magic," we're not invoking the same set of underlying assumptions and errors that make actual attempts to invoke magic in this world quite wrong.

One could, I suppose, posit that it is impious to imagine things that do not exist or universes governed by beings other than the true God. There might be some validity to that position. But in its most extreme (but perhaps logically necessary) variant, it would clearly exclude all exercises of the imagination and condemn all fairy tales. It is likely that there were never such things as dragons: is it wise, under this manner of thinking, for Catholics to read The Golden Legend? This strikes me as Catholicism meets Common Core: a lamentable flattening of the scope of human thought, even beyond the condemnation of errors or limitations made for pedagogical reasons.

Four, Father criticizes Lewis's Narnian and Space Trilogy tales. The latter, indisputably, present a view of the universe that is almost certainly incompatible (at the very least) with Catholic teaching on the effects of the Fall. They are not rigorously theological books, although, like many of Lewis's works, they are fun and contain some food for thought. His criticism of Narnia is rather weaker, I think: there is no reason (that I have ever discerned in Catholic teaching, at least) that God should not have created multiple worlds, although (as Lewis himself posited somewhere in the Space Trilogy, oddly enough) the idea of a second incarnation is probably totally false. The idea that children (and these are children's stories) are going to be inclined towards scientific materialism by The Magician's Nephew or the occult by the presence of an anthropomorphized star in The Voyage of the Dawn Treader is a stretch at best. (How many children associate "fallen stars" with the diabolical?) The idea that it was monstrous for Lewis to present a race of gnomes in The Silver Chair as preferring to live in the bowels of the earth simply takes the cake: if the things were made to live there, it's just good teleology that they would want to return. Hell, after all, isn't actually in the earth's core. Narnia isn't a substitute for the gospels, or even a good grade-school Catholic religion text, but it's a shade better than Father gives it credit for, I think.


Is it a little disconcerting that hippies and freaks have always gobbled up Tolkien? Yes, one has to admit it is. But that fairly stands merely for the proposition that the books don't deserve to be canonized: they are not a great new Catholic myth. They're merely literature, literature that takes place in a world apart and in which virtue and vice are presented in, I think, a compelling fashion. We could quibble over the import of plot elements, but even getting to that insider-baseball level of detail undermines a thesis that the works are, per se, unwholesome.

One final note: Father's essay touches on a Catholic assessment of the Renaissance, and the dispute over whether or not the reclamation of pagan styles, forms, and works was an improvement upon or a degradation of Catholic medieval culture. Chesterton, who Father cites, was certainly correct in this regard. But that does not mean that the culture of classical antiquity is bereft of value to the Christian: Chesterton wrote to that effect at length in The Everlasting Man, and Father himself discusses Plato. Surely then, without giving them more credit than they are due, their arts and letters retain at least aesthetic and literary value that can be enjoyed in good conscience today.

A pox upon Thomson West

The publishing standards of the legal-book industry are a shambles. First of all, what sort of title is "Prosser, Wade and Schwartz's Torts"? And is it Prosser, Wade and Schwartz's Torts: Cases and Materials (as the cover suggests) or Cases and Materials: Prosser, Wade and Schwartz's Torts (as the title page suggests)? Or is it merely Torts: Cases and Materials (or perhaps Cases and Materials: Torts), with the names being merely decoration? And why is there no bastard title page?

You publish only a very few types of books. Do better. (We won't even mention the absurdities perpetrated in multi-volume updated works like Wright & Miller.)

Ouch

Professor Grisez does not like papal interviews.

Excuse Me, Messrs. Brooks

But why isn't this item available in some permutation of blue, green, and gold? What am I supposed to do with USC colors?